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Abstract 
Accounts of citizenship by Presidents of the American Political Science Association (APSA) are examined through 
Mannheim‟s sociology of knowledge. We use Marshall as a platform to reconceptualise the dynamics of Mannheim‟s 
three incommensurable „thought styles‟: one liberal; one conservative; and one dialectically social. We suggest on this 
basis that American political citizenship in the twentieth century entails three incompatible but concurrent „thought 
styles‟, that involve a triple helix of political rationalities (see White and Donoghue 2003). 
The model is tested in a longitudinal study of „citizenship and democracy‟ in regular social scientific usage. The 
empirical material comprises the presidential addresses to the American Political Science Association (APSA) 
published in the American Political Science Review (APSR) from 1906 to 1997. The findings suggest that the addresses 
by the presidents of the Political Science Association of America invoke intertwining rationalities that relate twentieth 
century citizenship to classical political discourses. 
Keywords: Citizenship, Presidential Addresses, American Political Science 
1. Introduction  
Accounts of citizenship by Presidents of the American Political Science Association are examined through Mannheim‟s 
sociology of knowledge. In the introductory section on citizenship the paper will stress that citizenship is essentially 
contestable; that it is component of modern democracy and that it involves trinary orderings to accommodate tensions. 
Marshall‟s tripartite models of citizenship provide a point of departure: the widely discussed claim in his early work 
that civil, political and social rights emerged sequentially and the less noted account of democratic-welfare-capitalist 
tensions in the „hyphenated society‟.  
The paper will briefly sketch Marshall‟s arguments and then use them to reconceptualise the dynamics of Mannheim‟s 
three incommensurable „thought styles‟: one liberal; one conservative; and one dialectically social. The paper suggests 
on this basis that American political citizenship is seen as entailing three mutually incompatible „thought styles‟ that 
involve a triple helix of political rationalities (see White and Donoghue 2003). The paper suggests that the Presidents‟ 
accounts invoke the ragged intertwining of rationalities, and in the concluding discussion the citizenship will be linked 
to modern themes in the study of politics.  
„Citizenship‟ is a key marker of participation and membership. It has never proved amenable to exhaustive and 
comprehensive definition. Like other central social scientific concepts, it is essentially contestable, in that its meanings 
emerge in disputed and recursive use (Gallie 1964, Isin 2002). That has been a feature throughout all the accounts of 
citizenship written since Aristotle‟s pragmatic allowance for the difficulty: “[w]hat effectively distinguishes the citizen 
proper from all others is his participation in giving judgement and in holding office” (Politics 1962: 22). Since that 
simply shifts the issue to what „participation‟ means, and since accounts of „participation‟ are always entangled in 
politico-moral claims, the definitional problem remains. Marshall‟s version, that citizenship is “a status bestowed on 
those who are full members of a community” (1950: 28), leaves the question as open as did Aristotle‟s, for while 
„membership‟ may be formally defined, „community‟ retains all the uncertainty of its popular use. Contestable concepts 
can yield relatively fixed points in what would otherwise be an impossible churn, and they are also points of departure.  
Writers on citizenship often take Marshall‟s 1950‟s tripartite model of the successive stages of civil, political and social 
rights as a point of departure rather than as a given. One effect of the paradigmatic functioning of that model, however, 
has been the return of the „economic man‟ who has been striding through so much of the social analysis of the last two 
hundred years. To take civil, political and social as analytically distinct and as historically successive is already to 
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privilege the rationality, which defines economic man. Writers on citizenship have often included a „cultural‟ element 
as a replacement for what is inevitably lost in this analytical privileging; that was Parsons‟ solution. Another solution is 
to take Marshall‟s civil, political and social moments as co-emergent rather than as successive.  
Turner stressed those difficulties in his note on Mannheim‟s account of the intellectuals (1993: 170), where he revisited 
the problem of how analysts can make authoritative claims about social life when their own work is enmeshed in that 
life; if social analysis is as existentially shaped as other effects of broader processes then the basis of authority is 
uncertain. But his response to the problem is characteristic of social science; he noted it and moved on. When, for 
example, he held that it “is conceptually parsimonious to think of three types of resource: economic, cultural and 
political” (Turner 1997: 7), he seemed to locate his argument beyond the economic, cultural and political; presuming 
the analytical detachment he had earlier noted as problematic.  
2. Sociology of Knowledge 
Mannheim placed a triadic emphasis on the tension between incompatible ways of knowing. He had set the pattern in 
his earliest work in the sociology of knowledge, where like Scheler, he pointed to what was lost in epistemological 
accounts of knowledge. To accommodate the psychological, ontological and logical pre-commitments elided in the 
„either / or‟ of strict analysis, he argued that knowledge emerged as a relation between the knower (subject), the known, 
and the to-be-known (object), where the subject was always an intersubject, the known was always selectively drawn 
from tradition, and the to-be-known was then always historically contingent.  
“Every epistemological systematization”, he held, “is based upon this triad, and every conceivable formulation 
of the problem of knowledge is given by these three terms in some combination” (Mannheim 1922: 58).  
For all the limits of epistemology, Mannheim held that the self-relativisation in it was genealogically crucial to the 
sociology of knowledge. The individualising trend from Descartes‟ cogito to Kant‟s account of the subject gave one 
element in any knowledge under study. It had been followed, interactively, by the attention to collective subjects in 
Marxist ideological analysis and by the emergence of „the social‟ as an “ontological „terminus‟ of the motion 
transcending theoretical immanence” (Mannheim 1925: 68). Those three genealogical moments Ire permanently 
coexistent rather than successive and Ire fused in the „total relativisation‟ of the sociology of knowledge. 
Mannheim likewise depicted it as requiring three types of methods (1921-2; 1925). It should be „scientific‟, for although 
positivism had remained at “a relatively primitive level” in the bourgeois and proletarian nuances of Durkheimian work 
and of materialism respectively, it remained valuable, ironically, for its metaphysics of “essential contact with reality” 
(Mannheim 1925: 76). The sociology of knowledge should be hermeneutically focused on the weltanschauung, or 
unified complex of meanings prevailing at a given time (Mannheim 1921-2).  
Mannheim linked his sociology of knowledge to political movements. As seen in the variant links between theory and 
practice developed interdependently in the emergence of liberalism, socialism and conservatism and applied 
interdependently in the academy, the agonism of knowledge and its study was entangled in broader conflicts 
(Mannheim 1828a: 248-50; 1929: 117-46; 1927). The sociology of knowledge was to be a „dynamic synthesis‟ of the 
tendencies summarised in the three movements. 
Mannheim also called into question the „progress‟ implied or stated in theories of „stages‟. They stressed instead the 
continuing interaction between different ways of knowing, or between what Mannheim called „thought styles‟ (e.g. 
1927). The structure of their arguments was as crucial as what they argued. The trinary ordering they used is 
parsimonious, being the next simplest way of classifying beyond the „either/or‟ and „before/after‟ found in analytically 
linear accounts of „progress‟. At the same time it leaves in play the knowledge-politics preempted in those accounts. 
Mannheim had come to see intellectuals as uniquely authoritative. Despite their varied backgrounds, he saw them as 
relatively united by an education that „tends to suppress differences of birth, status, profession and wealth‟ (Mannheim 
1929: 155). Losing the „illusion that there is only one way of thinking‟ (Mannheim 1936: 12), they had „a maximum 
opportunity to test and employ the socially available vistas and to experience their inconsistencies‟ (Mannheim 1929: 
106). By collectively agreeing on those vistas, and by working in political parties and academia, they could fulfil „their 
mission as the predestined advocate of the intellectual interests of the whole‟ (Mannheim 1929: 158). 
After the First World War, Great Depression, rise of fascism and impending second World War, the risks of social 
dissolution were such that „the successful organization of society cannot be left to chance‟ (Mannheim 1935: 7). 
Intellectuals had to save liberal democracy from itself. Planning was needed for the renewal of a spiritual sense in the 
body politic, and a planned society would require experts „somehow similar to the priests, whose task it will be to watch 
that certain basic standards are established and maintained‟ (Mannheim 1943: 119). Through „social techniques‟, such 
as the political propaganda or reconditioning, „groups with determined political will, equipped with the necessary 
International Journal of Social Science Studies  Vol. 2, No. 1; 2014 
59 
 
psychological and sociological knowledge‟ could according to Mannheim educate the masses in their duties (1937: 
530–42). 
3. Political Speeches 
Conversation-analysts have shown in studies of political speeches and everyday conversations that the rhetorical 
devices most successful in eliciting applause or agreement are antitheses and triply structured lists (e.g. Atkinson 1984; 
Heritage and Greatbatch 1986). Antithesis always entails partisan foreclosure. It is always a means of the hierarchical 
ranking so widely associated with binary categories. Triple structured lists are more complex. To order by threes is to 
suggest that more cases could always be mentioned, and thus to stress the generality of the instances listed. But 
three-part lists also produce an effect of climactic closure (Potter 1995: 195-7) in a pattern, which appears to hold 
cross-culturally, conversationalists and audiences are cued to respond to them.  
Simmel‟s discussion of the interactions in small groups is canonical. His claim that “the triad is a structure completely 
different from the dyad, but not, on the other hand, specifically distinguished from groups of four or more members” 
matches the generality of triply structured lists, and his observation that the “appearance of the third party indicates 
transition, conciliation, and abandonment of absolute contrast” gives the same shift from fixity to fluidity as in that from 
binary to trinary orderings (Simmel 1908: 141, 145). Recalling the repetition across scale from conversations to 
political speeches, Caplow extended Simmel‟s analysis of small groups to a claim that triads are “the building blocks of 
which all social organizations are constructed” (1968: 1). It is commonly argued that binary ordering is a „deep structure‟ 
in human organisation (e.g. Maybury-Lewis and Almagor 1989), and it may be that the same is true of the trinary, at 
least in Indo-European cultures (e.g. Dumezil 1968). To the double helix of genetic evolution there corresponds a triple 
helix of political potential.  
To allow for the essential contestability of work in the social sciences, we follow White‟s (2002, 6) rhetorically topical 
definition of a „concept‟ as “a recurrent pattern of polymorphous, situated and value-charged discursive strategies in 
disciplinary writing”. This emphasises the inevitability of disputes over what concepts mean and how they should be 
used. It is a form of Mannheim‟s „dynamic synthesis‟ of what is always political. On that basis, we understand 
„citizenship‟ as a recursive effect of disputes over participation, membership and belonging, where those disputes entail 
the three forms of political rationality which Mannheim variously suggested: the linearly individual rationality of 
liberalism; the dialectically collective rationality of socialism; and the collective arationality of conservatism (see White 
and Donoghue 2003).  
This means that we do not have to move far from Aristotle‟s definition of citizenship as “participation in giving 
judgement and in holding office” (Politics 1962: 22), or from the echo of it in Marshall‟s definition as “a status 
bestowed on those who are full members of a community” (1950: 28). We simply focus on the contesting of 
„participation‟ and „membership‟. We illustrate our model of conflicting rationalities through a content analysis of the 
use of „citizenship‟ in presidential addresses to the „modern discipline‟ of the American Political Science Association. 
Specifically, we expect that the presidents‟ use of the concept will be linked only contingently to the shifts in 
inclusiveness suggested under Marshall‟s own models, and that liberal/individual accounts of citizenship will be 
interwoven with more collective and conservative versions.  
Following White and Donoghue (2003) we argue that Mannheim‟s sociology of knowledge allows a re-reading of 
modern American citizenship, which can accommodate difficulties in the field. As we noted earlier, something must be 
held constant in the study of social change. We use the sociology of knowledge to hold constant the „how‟ of disputes 
over citizenship rather than the „what‟. Instead of Turner‟s „three types of resource‟ we focus on three types of political 
rationality; liberalism, socialism and conservativism. 
4. Presidential Addresses 
Presidential addresses to the APSA are particularly well suited to the purposes outlined here. While any set of texts 
devoted to political analysis would serve, so long as it was systematically chosen from across a given period, the 
addresses have advantages over such other forms as articles in journals, textbooks, monographs, or books written for the 
general public, advantages which follow from their generic functioning and from the fact that they are American.  
That the addresses are by Americans is important. If the professional social scientist is the “most revealing symptom of 
modernity” (Haskell 1977: vii), then the effect should be strongest in the United States. American political science was 
long been the largest and most institutionalised branch of the discipline, with more than 15,000 members residing in 
over 80 countries worldwide, the American Political Science Association is the world's largest professional organization 
for the study of politics. Furthermore, it has been commonly remarked that the development of citizenship in the United 
States does not fit Marshall‟s model (see Turner 1993), so it provides a stronger test than British or European political 
science material. 
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Generically, the addresses fulfill several functions simultaneously. As the highest formal honour in American political 
science, the APSA‟s presidency is conferred on those whose work the most established members of the discipline have 
judged the most eminent, and the address then allows each president to expand on the methods and broader relevance of 
their substantive area, which is therefore sanctioned as central to the discipline; this is the presidential address as 
exemplary political science, formally recognized. Presented at the annual meeting to an audience of political scientists 
and guests from government, business and other disciplines, the address is also an oratory state-of-the-union speech, 
directing attention to failures and successes in the discipline at large; this is the presidential address about exemplary 
political science, formally justified. Delivered, finally, as a ceremonial feature of the meeting, and routinely published 
in the APSR, the address is a focus of disciplinary ritual, with all the re-affirmation of collectivity that that implies; this 
is the presidential address for exemplary political science, formally celebrated. The disciplinary and participatory 
membership, which is generically recognized, policed and celebrated in the addresses is then simultaneously a smaller 
scale version of the citizenship and democracy that we see as emergent from conflicting rationalities and a vehicle for 
access to it. 
On that basis, we have examined the presidential addresses to the APSA from 1906 to 1997, which also avoids any end 
of century or millennium effects. The series starts with the first address, Goodnow‟s foundation speech did not appear 
in the Review, which was not launched until two years after the Association was formed. No address was prepared in 
1918, when the annual meeting was cancelled amid wartime train travel restrictions, and there are three missing cases; 
if addresses were delivered at the APSA meetings of 1920, 1930 and 1952, they were not published in the normal 
sequence. 
5. Analysis 
The first step in the study of the addresses is a minimalist content analysis. We were interested as much in the 
presidents‟ casual and taken-for-granted references to citizenship as in any direct focus on the issue, we take the 
frequency of the use of „citizen‟, and of such derivatives as „citizenry‟ or „citizenship‟, as a marker of the issue‟s 
salience. We take the use of „participation‟ as an index of attention to that Marshallian theme, and similarly we use 
„individual‟, „society‟ and „community/culture‟ as political markers of the three different rationalities, which the 
presidents invoke.  
In this phase of the study, we are not interested in the „meanings‟ that the presidents impute to „citizen‟ or to the other 
concepts. To code meanings would be to preempt both the possibility that contradictory meanings are being advanced 
simultaneously and the essential contestability that we see at issue. We want only to show the co-presence of the 
concepts in the Presidential addresses. Having scanned the addresses into electronic form, we counted every occurrence 
of our selected terms, regardless of context. The numbers of presidents using each term are shown in Table 1 below. 
To show trends, we divided the eighty-eight accounts of the study into ten roughly equal periods, and derived mean 
scores for each period. To enable comparison between addresses, we have standardised all the counts as occurrences per 
thousand words. We show first the use of „citizen‟ and „participation‟ between 1906 and 1997 in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Use of Citizen &. Participation 1906 – 1997 
 
From 1960 to the end of the twentieth century the use of „participation‟ mirrors the frequency of the usage of „citizen‟ 
very closely. Since the 1960s participation was used to indicate not just political activity but a range of social, cultural 
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and economic endeavors. Whereas, the increasing use of „participation‟ and „citizen‟ parallel each other since the 
1960‟s, the use of the word „membership‟ appears to decline. For a finer grained picture of what „citizenship‟ entailed, 
we examined it in relation to the shifting relations between „citizen‟, ‘democracy‟ and „vote‟ in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Use of Citizen, Democracy & Vote 1906-1997 
Although the late peak here is consistent with recent attention to „citizenship‟, the overall pattern is hardly a „trend‟. Nor 
can it be fitted neatly to shifts in American political life. The rough consistency from the first two periods to the fourth, 
fifth and sixth corresponds with extension of the franchise, first to women and then to African Americans due to the 
civil rights movement, and in wartime, when American intervention was decisive in making Europe safe for western 
democracies. But the troughs during the Depression years of 1928-37 and from the late 1960s to the late 1980s are 
intriguing. Both low points were or included tumultuous times culturally and politically, yet the Presidents‟ responses to 
them were relatively detached from the concept of „citizenship‟.  
The results shown in Figure 3 indicate the use of individual‟, „society‟ and „community /culture‟ by the Presidents of 
the APSA. The relevance of the „individual‟ declines as expected between the two World Wars in contrast to the 
increased focus on community /culture. In post WW2 America both concepts are increasingly used throughout the 
1960s and 1970s, until the 1980s when community/ culture suddenly declines. The term society seems to 
counterbalance the use of individual and community /culture, until the end of the century when the individual appears to 
triumph over other forms of association and goes „bowling‟ alone (Putnam 2000). 
 
Figure 3. Use of Individual, Society & Community/Culture 
6. Discussion 
Mannheim (1952: 184–6) allows us to show „that a certain style of thought, an intellectual standpoint, is encompassed with 
a system of attitudes which in turn can be seen to be related to a certain economic and power system‟. Mannheim realized 
that „different social strata, then do not “produce different systems of ideas” (Weltanschauugen) in a crude, materialistic 
sense – in the sense in which lying ideologies can be “manufactured” – they “produce” them, rather, in the sense that social 
groups emerging within the social process are always in a position to project new directions of that “intentionally”‟. 
For Mannheim (1952: 189) „shifts in social reality are the underlying cause of shifts in theoretical systems‟. By 
developing Mannheim‟s „dynamic standpoint‟ we argue that the main task of a sociology of knowledge in relation to 
X   Citizen 
▄   Democracy  
▲   Vote 
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citizenship consists in specifying, for each temporal cross-section of the historical process, the various systematic 
intellectual standpoints on which the thinking of creative individuals and groups are based. Once intellectual 
standpoints are identified the different „trends of thought should not be confronted like positions in a mere theoretical 
debate‟ (ibid.). The sociological task according to Mannheim (1952) „consists in finding the social strata making up the 
intellectual strata in question‟: it is only in terms of the role of these strata within the overall process, in terms of their 
attitudes towards the emerging new reality, that we can define the fundamental aspirations and world postulates existing 
at a given time which can absorb already existing ideas and methods and subject them to a change of function – not to 
speak of newly created forms (op. cit.: 189). 
Hegel‟s conservative „dialectical method‟ provides an obvious sociological and historical example of how an idea is 
re-interpreted and modified. Marx changed Hegel‟s meaning and function of „dialectics‟ to suit the social conditions 
and future aspirations of the proletariat. In terms of citizenship we would argue that Mannheim allows us to reinterpret 
and modify Marshall‟s civil/capitalist, political/democratic and social/welfare elements and introduce arational, 
collective and cultural factors into the paradigm. The tensions in contemporary citizenship reflect the dynamics of new, 
national and global social movements based on demands, for animal, economic, and environmental rights. To stretch 
Marshall‟s under-developed evolutionary metaphor, we could even say that the contested emergence of citizenship 
rights entails a spiral of thought-styles comparable to the (double) helix proposed by Crick and Watson (1953). 
The historical and trans-situational recurrence of triadic ordering suggests something in human nature, that in a way that 
bridges the Great Divide between humans and non-humans. It is also consistent with contemporary neo-Darwinian 
accounts of human evolution that interested Mannheim‟s student Elias (Mennell and Goudsblom 1998: 12). The 
egoistic, nepotistic and altruistic dynamics that have been identified (see Boehm 2001), are permanently in tension, and 
match the individual, group-specific and diffusely collective forms of political rationality we have suggested in relation 
to American citizenship. 
7. Conclusion 
Accounts of citizenship by Presidents of the American Political Science Association (APSA) are examined using 
Mannheim‟s sociology of knowledge. We suggest that citizenship is essentially contestable; that it is component of 
modern democracy and that it involves trinary orderings to accommodate tensions. We order APSA President‟s 
intellectual views in terms of their „emerging reality‟ to highlight the claims made at particular times during the century.  
The President‟s speeches reflect ideas and aspirations but the claims are also subject to a change of function or 
emphasis depending on immediate social issues and concerns. Domestic cultural, economic and political ideas and 
concerns are also impacted by two World Wars and global depressions. 
The increased focus on the individual in American political life since the end of World War 2 perhaps reflects the 
growth of American prestige and prosperity. The counter culture and civil rights movement bloomed during the 1960s 
and 1970s but faded after the oil shock in the 1980s. The individual triumphed at the end of the twentieth century, as „he‟ 
did it the end of the nineteenth century, but this time the individual was no longer necessarily a single male, the 
individual could now be an independent female. The helix has returned to a familiar position but at a different point of 
cultural and political departure.  
We suggest that addresses by the presidents of the Political Science Association of America invoke different 
rationalities that relate twentieth century citizenship to classical political discourses or „thought styles‟: one liberal; one 
conservative; and one dialectically social. The primacy of the liberal individual has been challenged in the first decade 
of the 21st century by conservative demands for stronger forms of membership due to fears of terrorism and homeland 
security needs. We suggest that political contestation during the course of the 21
st
 century will be argued in terms of 
these classical political „thought styles‟ that are mobilized by intellectuals reacting to the cultural, economic and 
political events of the day. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 4. Use of Liberal, Collective and Communal 
 
Table 1. APSA Presidents 1906 to 1997 use of word citizen & participation 
President  Citizen Participation  President  Citizen Participation 
1906/Shaw  3 2  1952    
1907/Judson  7 0  53/Hearing   10 2 
1908/Bryce   6 0  54/Bunche   5 1 
1909/Lowell   2 0  55/McKinley   2 0 
1910/Wilson   0 0  56/Lasswell   1 1 
1911/Baldwin   6 0  57/Schattshneider  0 0 
1912/Hart   3 0  58/Key   0 0 
1913/Willoughby   6 0  59/Cole  4 2 
1914/Moore   1 0  60/Swisher  1 3 
1915/Freund   0 0  61/Redford  2 0 
1916/Lacy   6 1  62/Hyneman  4 0 
     63/Friedrich  15  20 
1917/Smith   3 2  64/Pritchett   3 2 
1918     65/Truman  1 0 
1919/Ford   0 1  66/Almond  0 1 
1920     67/Dahl  65 53 
1921/Rowe   0 1  68/Fainsod  1 0 
1922/Dunning   2 1  69/Easton  0 1 
1923/Garfield   1 0  70/Deutsch  1 1 
1924/Garner   2 0  71/Lane   0 0 
1925/Merriam   0 0  72/Eulau   2 9 
1926/Beard   2 0  73/Ward  0 1 
1927/Munro   16 0  74/Leiserson  7 9 
1928/Reeves   1 0  75/Ranney  3 0 
1929/Fairlie   0 0      
1930     76/B urns  0 4 
1931/Corwin   0 0  77/Beer  5 2 
1932/Willoughby  1 0  78/Wahike  1 3 
1933/Loeb   2 1  79/Epstein  2 3 
1934/Shepard   3 0  80/Miller  2 6 
1935/Coker   3 0  81/Lindblom  6 0 
1936/Holcombe   1 0  82/Lipset  10 5 
1937/Powell   0 4  83/Riker  0 2 
1938/Dykstra   4 1  84/Converse  8 2 
1939/Haines   2 1  85/Fenno  2 1 
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1940/Brooks   8 1  86/Wildaysky   6 5 
1941/Ogg   0 2  87/Huntington  0 6 
1942/Anderson   18 2  88/Waltz  0 0 
1943/Cushman   2 1  89/Pye  3 0 
1944/White   4 3  90/Shklar  16 1 
1945/Gaus   7 4  91/Lowi  1 2 
1946/Dodd   10 0  92/Wilson  0 0 
1947/MacMahon   1 1  93/Barker  0 3 
1948/Spencer   4 2  94/Jones  1 5 
1949/Wright   7 0  95/Verba  43 34 
1950/Pollock   9 6  96/Lijphart  23 55 
1951/0degard   2 0  97/Ostrom  13 10 
     Total 88   
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